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T HE WARSAW CONVENTION' is one of the best keptsecrets in international travel, especially for American
travellers. Many travellers, when asked if they know about the
Warsaw Convention, guess that it is a gathering in Poland for a
business function of some type. Most travellers do not realize
that if they are injured or killed while travelling on an interna-
tional flight, the Warsaw Convention severely limits their ability,
or the ability of their surviving relatives, to recover damages, un-
less willful misconduct on the part of the carrier is established in
accordance with Article 25(1) of the Convention. Those inter-
national travellers who are aware of the Warsaw Convention's
limitations and mandates on personal injury or wrongful death
recovery have most likely been a party to such litigation or know
of someone who has dealt with the Convention. Usually, the
passenger's experience with the Convention's recovery scheme
is unpleasant, at best.
In the wake of several major air disasters, including the Ameri-
can Airlines Boeing 757 crash in Cali, Colombia (December 20,
1995), and the TWA Flight 800 Boeing 747 crash into Long Is-
land Sound (July 17, 1996), international travellers are becom-
ing more aware of the Warsaw Convention limitations. There is
a movement afoot not only to change the limitations on damage
recovery, but also to provide some certainty regarding damage
recovery under the Convention. This Article traces this move-
ment through a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion
in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.2 and its progeny, as well as
the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Agreements,
and their effect on international travel.
I. THE ZICHERMAN DECISION AND ITS EFFECT ON
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES UNDER THE WARSAW
CONVENTION
A. WARSAW CONVENTION HISTORY
The Warsaw Convention, ratified by the U.S. in 1934, is a mul-
tilateral treaty committing its signatories to mutual obligations
under each signatory's legal system. Two primary goals of the
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 40105 (1994)) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
2 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996).




1929 Warsaw Convention were (1) to obtain a certain degree of
uniformity as to documentation, tickets, airway bills and liability
rules which govern international aviation travel,4 and (2) to
limit the potential liability of the young air carrier industry in
accidents that involve personal injury or death to passengers in
exchange for limiting the carrier's defenses.' Article 20 of the
Warsaw Convention specified that the carrier shall not be liable
for any damages if it can prove that it took all necessary meas-
ures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for the carrier
to take such measures to preclude the damage as defined under
the Warsaw Convention.6 Additionally, Article 22 limited the
carrier's potential damages to 125,000 francs, unless the passen-
ger could establish that the carrier was guilty of "willful miscon-
duct" as provided by Article 25 of the Convention.7 Thus, under
the original Warsaw scheme, a passenger injured on an interna-
tional flight8 would be entitled, upon proof of damages, to
125,000 francs (equivalent at that time to approximately 8,300
U.S. dollars), unless the carrier could establish a "due care de-
fense" under Article 20.'
The Warsaw Convention has undergone many modifications.
For example, the Hague Protocol of 1955 modified the Warsaw
Convention by raising the limits of recovery for passengers to
250,000 francs or 16,600 U.S. dollars.'0 The U.S. did not adhere
to the Hague Protocol, and in 1965, was on the verge of re-
nouncing the Warsaw Convention due to its low damage limits
on carrier liability." The U.S. ultimately agreed to participate
in the 1966 MontrealAgreement, in which carriers travelling to,
4 1 STUART M. SPEISER & CHARLES F. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 11:4, at
635-36 (1978 & Supp. 1996).
5 Id. at 636. These limitations have been criticized for many years by Congress,
lawyers, and other commentators on the basis that the Convention's original pol-
icy is outdated. Id. at 669-70.
6 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 20. An example of this defense would
be if a third party shot a missile at a signatory carrier's aircraft, and that carrier
asserts it was impossible to have prevented the ensuing damage.
7 Id. arts. 22, 25.
8 Id. art. 1 (2).
9 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 3, at 5; Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 20,
22.
10 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage By Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 373 [herein-
after Hague Protocol]. See K.M. Beaumont, The Warsaw Convention of 1929, as
Amended by the Protocol Signed at the Hague, on September 28, 1955, 22J. AIR LAW &
COM. 414 (1955).
11 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 3, at 7.
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from, or through the U.S. voluntarily agreed to (1) raise the
damage limits in Article 22 to $75,000; (2) waive the carrier's
Article 20 defense as to the $75,000 limit, thereby allowing the
plaintiff the presumptive right to compensation for damages up
to $75,000 upon simple proof of damages; (3) provide passen-
gers with a warning regarding the Warsaw Convention, as sup-
plemented by the Montreal Agreement; and (4) allow the
passenger the option of unlimited damages if willful misconduct
is established against the carrier. 12
The Warsaw Convention's damage limitations have not been
altered regarding international transportation to, from, or
through the U.S. for over thirty years. Plaintiffs and families of
victims injured or killed on international flights with a U.S.
nexus have two options: (1) they can prove actual damages up
to $75,000 without establishing a liability case against the car-
rier, or (2) they can attempt to prove that the carrier engaged in
"willful misconduct" in hope of gaining unlimited damages. Un-
fortunately, many injured passengers and families are forced to
prove that the carrier was guilty of willful misconduct to obtain
adequate compensation for injuries sustained on international
flights. 13 The issue of what damages are recoverable under the
Warsaw Convention is at the heart of this litigation.
B. DAMAGE RECOVERY UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION
1. Damage Recovery Pre-Zicherman
Commentators group damage recovery under the Warsaw
Convention into three periods: (1) the 1929-1991 period;
(2) the Lockerbie period; and (3) the Zicherman period.' 4 During
the 1929-1991 period, courts utilized individual state choice of
12 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and
Hague Protocol, May 13, 1966, 14 C.F.R. § 203 (1966), reprinted in GOLDHIRSCH,
supra note 3, at 317 [hereinafter Montreal Interim Agreement].
13 Michel F. Baumeister & Douglas A. Latto, An Analysis of the Current Law With
Respect to the Warsaw Convention's Limitations on Damages and the Effect of the Proposed
IATA Intercarrier Agreements, in AVIATION LIABILITY INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CEN-
TURY 38-51 (Oct. 9-10, 1996) (on file with The Aviation and Space Law Commit-
tee of the American Bar Association Tort and Insurance Practice Section).
14 Eugene Masamillo, Return to the Future: The Effect of Zicherman Versus Korean
Air Lines on Recoverable Damages in a Warsaw Convention Case. The Defense Perspec-
tive, in AVtATION LIABmLITY INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 78-104 (Sept. 6, 1996)
(on file with The Aviation and Space Law Committee of the American Bar Associ-
ation Tort and Insurance Practice Section); see generally Lee S. Kreindler,
"Zicherman'-Methodology in International Accidents, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 29, 1996, at 3.
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law rules and analysis to supplement the Convention and arrive
at the measure of damages recoverable under the Convention.15
The Lockerbie period has been described as the period in
which damages under the Warsaw Convention were determined
according to federal common law, which in some cases meant
relying on general maritime law.16 The Lockerbie case arose from
the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland in
1988. The Lockerbie II court grappled with the question of
whether, according to general maritime law, loss of society and
parental care damages were available under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. 17 The court noted that the Death On the High Seas Act
(DOHSA) 18 and the Jones Act 9 precluded loss of society dam-
ages, whereas general maritime law allowed for such damages.2 °
The court then reviewed Article 17 of the Convention, finding
that the drafters and signatories intended the "damage sus-
tained" provision in Article 17 to include compensatory dam-
ages for both pecuniary loss and loss of society. 21 The Lockerbie II
court nevertheless limited the recovery of loss of society dam-
ages to spouses and dependents. 22
Cases following the Lockerbie decisions have generally applied
federal common law and general maritime law to determine
damages under the Warsaw Convention. For example, in Hollie
v. Korean Air Lines Co.,23 the Second Circuit looked to federal law
to decide what damages were available under the Warsaw Con-
vention. The Hollie case, which stems from the Korean Air Lines
(KAL) Flight 007 shot-down on September 1, 1983, was decided
shortly after the Second Circuit's decision in Zicherman v. Korean
15 Masamillo, supra note 14, at 83 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster near New
Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Disaster at De-
troit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 750 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Nfld. on Dec. 12, 1985, 684 F. Supp. 927, 933 (W.D.
Ky. 1987) (holding that Warsaw Convention allows compensatory damages under
state law but excludes punitive damages)).
16 See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267,
1279 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Lockerbie 1]; 37 F.3d 804, 828 (2d Cir. 1994)
[hereinafter Lockerbie If]; Masamillo, supra note 14, at 84.
17 Lockerbie II, 37 F.3d at 828.
18 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1994).
19 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994).
20 Lockerbie II, 37 F.3d at 828-29.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 830 (The court also held damages for lost parental care for a minor are
pecuniary and recoverable under the Convention).
23 60 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Air Lines Co.24 The Hollie court addressed three damage issues:
(1) whether claims for survivors' grief and loss of society were
recoverable under the Warsaw Convention; (2) whether a dece-
dent's nieces and nephews had a right to damages for loss of
nurturing and guidance; and (3) whether a decedent's brother
was entitled to recover for loss of support.25
Applying federal maritime law, 6 the Hollie court upheld the
decedent's pain and suffering award, remanded the loss of soci-
ety claim so that a jury could determine whether the dependents
of the decedent were entitled to such damages, denied the
claims for survivors' grief damages, denied the claim for loss of
nurturing and guidance damages as to decedent's nieces and
nephews, 27 and upheld the decedent's brother's loss of support
claim.28  The Hollie court followed the prior Second Circuit
holdings in Lockerbie and Zicherman that pain and suffering of
the decedent, loss of support to survivors, and nurturing and
guidance damages (if the interaction between the child and de-
cedent rose to a level of parental guidance) were available
under federal maritime law.29 Damages for the grief and mental
anguish of the decedent's survivors were not available under
federal maritime law.A
Similarly, in In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December
21, 1988 (Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.), 2 the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York upheld a sur-
viving wife's recovery for financial loss, loss of society, loss of
services and interest awards under the Warsaw Convention. The
Pescatore district court decision did not indicate whether federal
common law or federal maritime law governed the jury charge
and the damage award under the Convention. Nonetheless, the
award for loss of society is in line with the Lockerbie II and Hollie
decisions.
24 See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 43 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1994), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996). In fact, at the time of the Hollie
decision, certiorari had been granted for the Zicherman case.
25 Hollie, 60 F.3d at 92.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 94 (holding that damages are recoverable if sufficient evidence is es-
tablished as to the child's relationship and upbringing with the decedent).
28 Id. at 93-94.
29 Id. at 92-94.
30 Id. at 94; see also Ocampo v. Korean Air Lines Co., No. 83-2941, 1994 WL
731569 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 1994); Oldham v. Korean Air Lines Co., No. 83-3889,
1994 WL 725277 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 1994).
31 887 F. Supp. 71, 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
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2. The Zicherman Period
The third and current period of damage recognition under
the Warsaw Convention has been coined the "Zicherman pe-
riod.13 2 The Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines decision derived from
the wrongful death case brought by the mother and sister of
decedent Muriel Kole, who died while on board KAL Flight
007. 33 KAL Flight 007, which departed New York, with a stop in
Anchorage, was bound for Seoul, South Korea when it strayed
into Soviet airspace and was shot down by a Soviet military air-
craft. The KAL aircraft crashed into the Sea of Japan, killing all
269 passengers on board.
Following a multi-district liability trial in which KAL was
found guilty of willful misconduct, the Zicherman case was trans-
ferred back to district court for a trial on damages. 4 Prior to
the damages trial, defendant KAL moved for a determination
that DOHSA limited dependent survivors' recovery to pecuniary
losses. 5 KAL's motion was denied and the trial court held that
plaintiffs could submit their loss of society, mental injury and
grief, and decedent's pre-death conscious pain and suffering
claims to the jury.36 The jury awarded decedent's mother
mental injury and loss of society damages; and awarded dece-
dent's sister mental injury, loss of society, loss of support and
loss of inheritance damages. 7 The jury also awarded decedent's
estate pain and suffering damages and pre-judgment interest on
the total damage recovery.3
KAL appealed the district court's award of damages on the
grounds that: (1) federal maritime law barred plaintiffs' recov-
ery for loss of society and mental injury or grief damages; and
(2) the evidence was insufficient to support the conscious pain
and suffering award to decedent's estate, and the loss of support
and inheritance awards to decedent's sister. 9 On appeal, the
Second Circuit looked to the Lockerbie decisions and held that
federal common law-general maritime law allowed compensa-
tory non-pecuniary damages under the Convention.40 The
32 Masamillo, supra note 14, at 84.
33 43 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996).
34 Id. at 20.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 21.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 22.
40 Id. at 21.
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court found that the application of general maritime law, rather
than DOHSA, was more appropriate in promoting the Conven-
tion's goals and maintaining a uniform law.4 The court held
that loss of society damages were available only to dependents of
the decedent.42 The court denied plaintiffs' grief and mental
injury awards, affirmed the jury award as to decedent's pre-
death pain and suffering, and remanded the loss of support and
inheritance awards for the jury to determine whether a suffi-
cient showing of dependency was made to uphold these
awards. 13
KAL appealed the Second Circuit's decision to the Supreme
Court of the United States, which granted certiorari.44 The
Supreme Court declined to follow the Lockerbie decisions regard-
ing damage recovery under the Warsaw Convention. The pre-
cise question before the Court was whether loss of society
damages were recoverable under Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention.4" KAL did not appeal decedent's pain and suffering
award.46
The Supreme Court in Zicherman reviewed Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention, which provides carrier liability for a
passenger's
damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if
the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place
on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking.47
The Court analyzed whether "damage" or "harm" should take
on a broad meaning to include any "legally cognizable harm" or
whether "damage" should be left to the "adjudicating courts to
specify what harm is cognizable."4 In making its determination,
the Court also considered Article 24(2) of the Convention,
which specifies that the Convention does not affect the determi-
nation of who may bring suit or what the rights of the claimants
might be.4 9 In doing so, the Zicherman Court refused to adopt
41 Id. at 22.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 23-24.
44 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996).
45 Id. at 631.
46 Id. at 631 n.1.
47 Id. at 632; Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
48 Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 632-33.
49 Id. at 634; Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 24(2), 49.
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federal common law or rely on federal maritime law to provide
the definition and meaning of recoverable damages under the
Warsaw Convention. 5° The Court noted that Article 24, com-
bined with Article 17, supported a finding that damage ques-
tions under the Warsaw Convention "are to be answered by the
domestic law selected by the courts of the contracting states. "51
The Court next turned to the question of which sovereign's
domestic law to apply. The Zicherman parties agreed that if com-
pensable harm was not defined in the Warsaw Convention, U.S.
law would be the applicable law.52 If the parties did not stipulate
to U.S. law, the choice of law rules of the forum jurisdiction
would apply.53
Turning to the final question of what U.S. law would govern
the recovery of loss of society damages under the Convention,
the Court rejected the Second Circuit's holding in Zicherman5 4
that general maritime law would govern a Warsaw Convention
action regardless of whether the crash occurred on land or on
the high seas.55 The Court made it clear that it would not de-
velop nor follow a "common law rule-under cover of general
admiralty law or otherwise-that will supersede the normal fed-
eral disposition" of a damages issue under the Convention.56
The Court concluded that Articles 17 and 24(2) of the Conven-
tion merely act as a "pass through, authorizing [the Court] to
apply the law that would govern in the absence of the Warsaw
Convention. '57 The Supreme Court then held that DOHSA ap-
plied to the Zicherman case because the decedent's death oc-
curred within the provisions of DOHSA.58 Since DOHSA barred
recovery of loss of society damages, the Court reversed plaintiffs'
loss of society awards. 5' The Court further stated that neither
state nor general maritime law serve as a supplement to DOHSA
so as to provide an additional basis for recovery of loss of society
50 Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 634.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 635.
53 Id.
54 43 F.3d at 21-22.




59 Id. at 637.
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damages.6" In sum, the Zicherman Court concluded that "Arti-
cles 17 and 24(2) of the Warsaw Convention permit compensa-
tion only for legally cognizable harm, but leave the specification
of what harm is legally cognizable to the domestic law applicable
under the forum's choice-of-law rules."6 1
C. POST-ZICHEIRMAN CASE LAW
Cases decided before the Zicherman decision are proof that
uniformity will not be had when courts are deciding what dam-
ages are allowable under the Warsaw Convention.62 This is the
result of different forums deciding under their respective choice
of law rules which law to apply in order to uphold the Conven-
tion's Articles 17 and 24(2) damage provisions. Cases decided
since Zicherman evidence that uniformity will not rule the day,
and that damage awards under the Convention are dependent
upon the facts of each case, where the case is filed, and whether
federal or state choice of law rules will be applied in arriving at
plaintiffs' recoveries.
1. Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co.
The Zicherman holding affected many of the KAL cases pend-
ing when the Supreme Court decided the case. The effect has
not been the same across the board. For example, in Forman v.
Korean Air Lines Co.,63 the District of Columbia appellate court
strictly construed the Zicherman holding to determine whether
(1) a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, and (2) a survi-
vors' mental anguish and grief were recoverable under the Con-
vention and the Zicherman decision. The Forman court
concluded that the decision by the Supreme Court in Zicherman
precluded the family from recovering "loss of care, comfort, so-
ciety, companionship, [or] love and affection. ' 4
The Forman court declined to review the family's claims of
mental grief and anguish or KAL's challenge to the jury's award
of $120,000 for decedent's pain and suffering, as these specific
60 Id. The Court noted that although one of the goals of the Warsaw Conven-
tion was to promote uniformity, uniformity could not be had in all areas and
applications of the Convention. Id. at 636.
61 Id.
62 The Zicherman Court itself recognized this would be the result of its holding.
See id. at 636.
63 84 F.3d 446, 447 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 582 (1996).
64 Id. at 448.
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issues were not raised initially on appeal.65 The Forman court
held there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's award as
to decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, in addition to the
loss of financial contributions.6 6 The court also affirmed the dis-
trict court's calculation of pre-judgment interest at the prime
rate.67
2. Saavedra v. Korean Air Lines Co.
Another KAL case pending at the same time the Supreme
Court ruled in Zicherman was the Ninth Circuit's Saavedra v. Ko-
rean Air Lines.68 Saavedra filed two wrongful death cases under
the Warsaw Convention and DOHSA.69 Prior to the damages
trial, the trial court specified that loss of society damages were
not available under DOHSA or the Warsaw Convention.7 0 The
jury awarded damages for loss of support, loss of past and future
services and inheritance, mental anguish and grief, funeral and
memorial expenses, and the decedent's pre-death pain and
suffering.71
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the plaintiff
was entitled to recover for loss of society, decedent's pre-death
pain and suffering, and a higher pre-judgment interest award,
and also evaluated sufficiency of the evidence points relating to
loss of support. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the Zicherman
Supreme Court decision and held as follows:
(1) loss of society damages are not available under DOHSA;72
(2) mental anguish and grief claims of the survivors are non-
pecuniary damages and are not available under DOHSA;73
65 Id. at 448-49. KAL argued decedent's pre-death pain and suffering was not
available under DOHSA. Id.
66 Id. at 447.
67 Id. at 449-51.
68 93 F.3d 547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 584 (1996).
69 Id. at 594.
70 Id. at 549. The trial judge who actually instructed the jury allowed an in-
struction on loss of society, but refused to enter the jury's $300,000 loss of society
award. Id.
71 Id. at 550.
72 Id. at 551. The parties agreed that, under Zicherman, loss of society damages
were not available. Id.
73 Id. at 552. The court rejected Saavedra's mental anguish-grief damages ar-
gument that, although DOHSA bars non-pecuniary damages, DOHSA's § 4
should allow recovery under Korean law. Id.
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(3) passenger pre-death pain and suffering claims are non-pe-
cuniary damages and are not available under DOHSA;74
(4) the district court's pre-judgment interest award and loss of
support damages were proper.7
5
The Saavedra appellate court noted that Zicherman did not di-
rectly address whether compensation for the mental anguish
and grief of decedent's survivors or decedent's pre-death pain
and suffering were available under DOHSA.76 The court also
noted that plaintiffs elected to proceed directly under the War-
saw Convention, and that Zicherman held DOHSA was the appli-
cable statute to determine damages under the Convention
where the death occurred on the high seas.77
3. Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co.78
(Bickel 1) followed the Supreme Court's Zicherman holding. The
Bickel I trial court denied KAL's motions to have DOHSA govern
the question of who were the proper beneficiaries for pecuniary
damages and held alternatively that if non-pecuniary damages
were awarded, only spouses and financially dependent benefi-
ciaries were entitled to recover.7 ' The district court not only al-
lowed recovery of pecuniary damages to dependent and non-
dependent relatives, but also allowed non-pecuniary damages.,0
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's
award of damages in light of Zicherman. The Sixth Circuit ana-
lyzed Articles 17 and 24(2) of the Warsaw Convention, deter-
mined that it must engage in a choice of law analysis, and
applied a federal choice of law rule." The Bickel I court noted
74 Id. at 553-54. As to decedent's pre-death pain and suffering award, the Saa-
vedra court again held that these damages were not "pecuniary" in nature and did
not fall within 46 U.S.C. § 762 pecuniary damage provisions within the recovery
for decedent's immediate family and dependant relatives set forth under
DOHSA's § 761. Id. at 553. Further, the survival claim could not be supple-
mented by Korean law or by general maritime law. Id.
75 Id. at 555.
76 Id. at 550-51.
77 Id. at 551.
78 83 F.3d 127 (6th Cir. 1996), superseded by Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96
F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
79 Id. at 129.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 130 (noting that in diversity cases, federal courts must apply the law of
the forum; however, since diversity was not the founding basis ofjurisdiction, the
court was not compelled to follow state choice of law rules).
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Zicherman's holding that the Convention contained no rule of
law governing the award of damages, nor did the Convention
empower a court to develop any common law rule or applica-
tion, under general admiralty law or otherwise, to supplant the
choice of law analysis to be made in each case. 2 Although the
Bickel I court recognized that there is "no federal general com-
mon law," it applied a federal choice of law rule, reasoning that
state choice of law rules undermine the "concrete federal policy
of uniformity and certainty" that is mandated by the Warsaw
Convention. 3 The Bickel I court thus found it appropriate to
"craft" a special federal choice of law rule to determine damages
under the Warsaw Convention.84
In applying its own federal choice of law rule, the Bickel I
court looked to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to
determine whether U.S. or South Korean law should govern the
damage awards under the Convention.8 5 The Bickel I court con-
sidered section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws factors and held that U.S. law would govern these cases,
and that, in accordance with Zicherman, DOHSA would apply to
the damage recoveries.8 6 The court then held that loss of soci-
ety damages were not pecuniary under DOHSA and reversed
the district court's award of damages. 87 Additionally, the court
reversed the trial court's award of survivors' damages for grief,
despite the fact that Zicherman did not address this issue, noting
that the court could make no distinction between a survivor's
non-pecuniary mental anguish and grief damages and damages
for loss of society.88 Lastly, the Bickel I court reviewed whether
recovery for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering was avail-
able under DOHSA. The court again held that these damages
82 Id. at 130; see also Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636.
83 Bickel I, 83 F.3d at 130; see generally Koirala v. Thai Airways Int'l, No. C-94-
2644SC, consol. with, No. C-95-0082SC, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9806 (N.D. Cal.
July 10, 1996) (relying on federal common law, namely general federal maritime
law, to determine damages available under Warsaw Convention post-Zicherman).
84 Id. The Bickel I court reasoned that since Zicherman did not address the
question of whether U.S. or another country's law applied, it allowed the court to
craft a federal choice of law rule in which to determine damages under the Con-
vention. Id. at 130 n.2.
85 Id. at 130-31.
86 Id. at 131.
87 Id. at 132.
88 Id.
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were non-pecuniary in nature, and therefore, not allowable
under DOHSA.89
Plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing as to the court's reversal
of decedents' recovery for pre-death pain and suffering, which
was again reviewed by the Sixth Circuit (Bickel I1).90 The Sixth
Circuit held that KAL failed to raise its challenge to decedent's
award of pre-death pain and suffering in its opening appellate
briefs, and its failure to do so constituted waiver of the issue on
appealY'
4. Beirn v. Korean Air Lines Co.
In another KAL case, Beirn v. Korean Air Lines Co.,9 2 plaintiffs
filed wrongful death suits on behalf of the estates of Cathy
Brown Speir and James Beirn, passengers on KAL Flight 007.
The court reviewed the trial court's award of loss of society dam-
ages, damages for decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, sur-
vivor grief damages, and loss of non-physical service damages.
The Beirn court, in accordance with Zicherman, held that
DOHSA was the internal law of the U.S. and was the statute gov-
erning damages for wrongful death claims under the Conven-
tion pertaining to Flight 007." The Beirn court also held that
DOHSA does not provide for non-pecuniary damages, and
struck plaintiffs' loss of society damages in accordance with
Zicherman.94 The court also held that a survivor's grief and
mental anguish damages under DOHSA are non-pecuniary, and
are not recoverable under DOHSA 9 5
What is most interesting about the Beirn decision is its evalua-
tion of the claim for decedent's pre-death pain and suffering
under DOHSA and Zicherman. The Beirn court surgically dis-
sected the Zicherman decision, noting that the Zicherman plain-
tiffs received a $100,000 jury award for decedent's conscious
pain and suffering, which was left intact by the Zicherman Second
89 Id.
90 Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
91 Id. The Bickel II court also found the evidence was sufficient to support the
awards of pre-death pain and suffering of decedents and did not allow remittitur
of these awards. Id.
92 Nos. 83-CV-4624, 83-CV-4626 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1996).
93 Id. at 3-4. See Anderson v. SAM Airlines, 939 F. Supp. 167 (E.D.N.Y. 1996),
for an analysis of a land-based Convention choice of law issue as to the division of
settlement proceeds among Warsaw claimants.
94 Beim, No. 83-CV-4624 at 4.
95 Id.
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Circuit96 and Supreme Court.9 7 Noting that the Zicherman deci-
sion did not preclude nor render an opinion as to the recovery
for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, the Beirn court
explored whether DOHSA barred such a recovery and found
DOHSA to be silent as to recovery for survival actions.98 In fur-
ther analysis of DOHSA and the award of a decedent's pre-death
pain and suffering, the Beirn court explored previous DOHSA
holdings as to exclusivity under DOHSA.99
The Beirn court also reviewed Article 17 of the Convention
and the Zicherman decision, noting that neither the Warsaw Con-
vention nor Zicherman ruled out plaintiffs' assertion of a survival
action claim for damages under the Convention.100 Lastly, the
Beirn court noted that it would be patently unfair to allow cer-
tain KAL claimants to recover survival awards simply because
these awards were not challenged by KAL on appeal, and then
disallow other KAL claimants' survival awards because KAL
chose to appeal those awards. 10 1 The Beirn court ultimately held
that the Supreme Court in Zicherman gave tacit approval to sur-
vival actions under DOHSA, and the court thereby rejected the
KAL holdings in the Saavedra, Bickel I, and In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster of September 1, 1983 cases, which precluded survival ac-
tions under DOHSA 10 2 There now exists a split of authority as
to whether a decedent's pre-death and suffering-survival claim is
recoverable under DOHSA.
5. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983
Finally, in the case of In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September
1, 1983,103 the District of Columbia district court adopted the
Sixth Circuit's ruling in Bickel that the application of a "federal
96 Zicherman, 43 F.3d at 24.
97 Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 631 n.1.
98 Beirn, No. 83-CV-4624 at 7-10.
99 For example, in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 798 F. Supp.
755, 757-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), the court held that a jury trial was permissible in a
death on the high seas case, that DOSHA was not exclusive as to deaths occurring
on the high seas, and that the Warsaw Convention created a separate cause of
action for wrongful death and survival-decedent's pre-death pain and suffering
claims. The defendants did not challenge the court's holding of a separate cause
of action for a survival claim. Id. at 762; Beirn, No. 83-CV-4624 at 10.
100 Beim, No. 83-CV-4624 at 11-15; Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17;
Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 633.
101 Beirn, No. 83-CV-4624 at 19-20.
102 Id. at 18.
103 935 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1996).
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choice of law rule" is necessary to preserve the uniformity and
certainty of the Warsaw Convention. 10 4 Like the court in Bickel,
the district court looked to the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws to hold that U.S. law should govern the damage
issues of the cases, and in particular that DOHSA provides the
substantive U.S. law regarding damages under the Conven-
tion.' O The court summarily held that loss of society damages
and a survivor's grief damages are not available under DOHSA,
as these damages are non-pecuniary and do not fit into the
DOHSA damage recovery scheme. 0 6 The court went on to hold
that a survival action for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffer-
ing is also non-pecuniary and not recoverable under DOHSA. 107
The court further held that general maritime law will not serve
to supplement damages available under DOHSA. °'0 Certiorari
for an interlocutory appeal has been granted in this case on
whether survivor mental anguish and grief damages, and sur-
vival action damages are available under DOHSA.
6. Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways
There have also been non-KAL cases decided following the
Zicherman decision. Two of these cases are Pan Am decisions
(one published and one unpublished omnibus order) pertain-
ing to the crash of Pan Am Flight 103 at Lockerbie, Scotland.
A single liability trial under the Warsaw Convention was held
for this multi-district litigation, and the jury found defendants
liable for willful misconduct that led to the fatal crash. 09 Fol-
lowing the liability finding, individual cases were remanded to
the jurisdictions in which the cases were originally filed for dam-
age trials. 1 0
The Second Circuit case of Pescatore v. Pan American World Air-
ways was actually tried before Zicherman, and damages were ini-
tially found to be governed by federal common law principals as
set forth in the Lockerbie decisions."' Pan Am ultimately ap-
104 Id. at 13.
105 Id. at 13-14.
106 Id. at 14-15.
107 Id. at 15.
108 Id.
1M9 See generally Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, 97 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1996)
(appeal from In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988, 887 F. Supp. 71
(E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
110 Id.
111 Id.; Lockerbie 11, 37 F.3d at 829-30.
1098
WARSAW CONVENTION FA CEL1FF
pealed, and prior to oral argument, the Supreme Court decided
Zicherman. Pan Am argued on appeal that (1) a new trial was
required because Ohio law permitted the introduction of evi-
dence of plaintiffs plans to remarry; (2) a new trial was in order
due to the court's allowing the mention of the willful miscon-
duct holding against Pan Am; (3) the loss of society and finan-
cial support awards were excessive under Ohio law; and (4) the
pre-judgment interest award should be vacated under Ohio
law.' 12
The Pescatore appellate court went through the Zicherman
choice of law analysis to determine which law to apply in assess-
ing the damages awarded in the case. In its analysis of the
Zicherman case, the Pescatore court held that since the Pan Am
crash was over land, and since no federal statute governed the
issue of compensatory damages for air disasters over foreign
lands, a federal court should apply the relevant state's choice of
law doctrine absent a "significant conflict between some federal
policy or interest and the use of state law."' 1 3 The Second Cir-
cuit next embarked upon a choice of law analysis, applying New
York choice of law rules, and held that the law of Ohio, not fed-
eral maritime law, would govern the damages in the Pescatore
case.1
14
The court looked to Ohio law to determine whether it was
error for the trial court not to inform the jury that the plaintiff,
who lost her husband in the Pan Am disaster, had plans to re-
marry."' The Pescatore court held under Ohio law that a new
trial was not necessary on this point, and also held that the
court's informing the jury of Pan Am's willful misconduct ver-
dict was insufficient to warrant a new trial." 6 Finally, the court,
in accordance with Ohio law, upheld the award for loss of soci-
ety and loss of financial support.' 17
7. Shastri v. Pan American World Airways
Another Lockerbie decision from the Southern District of
Florida, Shastri v. Pan American World Airways,1 18 was decided af-
ter Zicherman. Initially, the court engaged in a choice of law
112 Pescatore, 97 F.3d at 5.
113 Id. (citing O'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2055 (1994)).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 15.
116 Id. at 16-18.
117 Id. at 14-15.
118 No. 90-2836-Civ-Davis (S.D. Fla. May 23, 1996).
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analysis to determine whether Scottish law or the law of the
domiciliary jurisdictions of the plaintiffs would govern damage
recovery under the Warsaw Convention. The parties in the Shas-
tri case agreed that Florida choice of law rules would govern the
choice of law analysis because Zicherman required the courts to
look to the choice of law rules of the forum jurisdiction.11
In addition to applying Florida's choice of law rules, the Shas-
tri court looked to the principles set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws for guidance. The court held that
under the Restatement's significant relationship test, the doc-
trine of lex loci delicti applies to bring the case under Scottish law,
unless other factors combine to outweigh the place of the injury,
that being Scotland. 120 The court evaluated the alleged interests
of the other jurisdictions asserted by the defendants,'12 but con-
cluded Scottish law should govern, as none of the decedents'
domiciles had a relationship sufficient to outweigh the presump-
tion in favor of Scottish law' 122 The court further held that the
application of Scottish law, although not mandated under the
Warsaw Convention, provided uniformity and bore the most sig-
nificant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.123 The
application of Scottish law also promoted the goals of trial effi-
ciency and the productive use of judicial resources. 24 In addi-
tion, it furthered the compensatory goal of the Warsaw
Convention without detrimentally affecting policies of various
domiciliary jurisdictions that seek to provide some protection to
resident defendants. 25 Under Scottish law, the court deter-
mined that plaintiffs were entitled to solatium, which permits re-
covery for:
(1) distress and anxiety endured by the relatives in contempla-
tion of the suffering of the deceased before his death;
(2) grief and sorrow of the relative caused by the decedent's
death; and
(3) loss of such non-patrimonial benefit as a relative might
have been expected to derive from the decedent's society and
guidance, if the deceased had not died. 126
119 Id. at 3-4; Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 634.
120 Shastri, No. 90-2836 at 5.
121 Id. at 8-13.
122 Id. at 13.
123 Id. at 12.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 12-13.
126 Id. at 6.
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8. Brink's Ltd. v. South African Airways
Another Second Circuit decision following on the heels of
Zicherman was Brink's Ltd. v. South African Airways,127 which in-
volved the appeal of a partial summary judgment granted on a
cargo claim under the Warsaw Convention. In Brink's, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that the trial court erred in applying New
York law to determine whether the defendant airline was guilty
of willful misconduct under Article 25 of the Convention. 128 In-
stead, the law of the forum jurisdiction, as set forth under Arti-
cle 25 of the Convention and Zicherman, should apply to
determine what constitutes willful misconduct under Arti-
cle 25.129 Accordingly, the law of the U.S. would determine what
conduct would deprive the defendant of the limited liability pro-
tection set forth in the Convention. 13 0
The Brink's court did not look to federal common law, specifi-
cally general maritime law, to provide the law of the forum, but
noted that in ordinary diversity cases federal courts would apply
the law of the forum.131 Since the Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act (FSIA) provided the sole basis of federal court jurisdiction
in Brink's, much like DOHSA in Zicherman, the FSIA usually
looks to state law to provide the law of the forum.13 2 According
to the FSIA, New York law applied.'33 The court therefore en-
gaged in a choice of law analysis under New York law and con-
cluded that South Africa had the greatest interest in the
application of its law and was the center of gravity for this dis-
pute. 34 The Second Circuit then remanded the case to the trial
court for a determination under South African law as to whether
the defendant's actions constituted willful misconduct under Ar-
ticle 25 of the Convention. 13 5
127 93 F.3d 1022 (2d Cir. 1996).
128 Id. at 1032.
129 Id.
13o Id. at 1029 (noting that the Zicherman decision "admonished lower courts to
refrain from developing federal common law 'under cover' of advancing the goal
of uniformity in the Warsaw Convention cases").
131 Id. at 1029-30.
132 Id. at 1030.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1031-32.
135 Id. at 1032.
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9. Post-Zicherman Confusion
As evidenced by the foregoing discussion, the cases following
the Zicherman Supreme Court decision have yielded varied re-
sults. For example, three of the KAL cases decided at the dis-
trict and appellate court levels looked to the Zicherman decision
to provide the basis and standard of review for assessing the
damages available under DOHSA. 36 Yet even among these
three cases, the damage awards to family members varied as to a
decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. 137
Various district courts have also applied differing choice of
law analysis, under both state and federal choice of law provi-
sions. 1 8 In at least one case, the Sixth Circuit employed a fed-
eral choice of law analysis "crafted" to preserve the Convention's
goal of uniformity, despite Zicherman's finding that the goal of
uniformity was not relevant to determine damages allowed
under the Convention.1 39
Due to the differing choice of law approaches taken by the
various courts in evaluating damage awards under the Conven-
tion, the damages awarded in future cases will surely vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 4 ° Warsaw claimants, in some cases,
will have their damages decided based upon state choice of law
rules, which will provide damage awards more in line with their
home forum jurisdictions. For the jurisdictions that continue to
apply federal choice of law rules based upon federal maritime or
admiralty law, it remains uncertain if the Supreme Court will
address this issue and clarify whether the Zicherman decision spe-
cifically precludes this type of federal analysis.'
136 Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 84 F.3d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Saave-
dra v. Korean Air Lines Co., 93 F.3d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1996); Beirn, No. 83-CV-
4624 at 3.
137 Compare Forman, 84 F.2d at 448 with Saavedra, 93 F.3d at 552-54 and Beirn,
No. 83-CV-9624 at 21-23.
138 Compare Shastri v. Pan Am. World Airways, No. 90-2836-Civ-Davis (S.D. Fla.
May 23, 1996) with In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 807 F. Supp.
1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
139 Compare Bickel I, 83 F.3d at 130 with Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636.
140 Damage awards under the Convention in the Zicherman period are most
similar to the awards rendered in the 1929-1991 pre-Lockerbie period.
141 The U.S. Supreme Court in three post-Zicherman cases denied certiori and
declined to address some of the inconsistent lower court rulings as to damage
recovery under the Warsaw Convention as guided by the Zicherman decision. See
Forman v. Korean Airlines Co., 84 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 582
(1996); Saavedra v. Korean Airlines Co., 93 F.3d 547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 584 (1996); Bickel v. Korean Airlines Co., 96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
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D. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AwARDs POST-ZICI-,,iRMAN
Although the Zicherman Court did not address the recovery of
punitive damages under the Convention, there is a renewed de-
bate as to whether these damages are available in light of its
holding that damages are to be determined by the domestic law
selected by the courts of the contracting states. Although there
have been no post-Zicherman cases addressing the punitive dam-
age issue, 14 2 there has been speculation that punitive damages
are recoverable under the Convention in those jurisdictions that
allow recovery for such damages. This speculation arises from
the Zicherman mandate that courts apply domiciliary law in as-
sessing damages under the Convention and from the fact that
the Convention, arguably, does not preclude these damages
under Article 17 or Article 24(2).14" Nonetheless, there is a long
history of courts refusing to allow punitive damage recovery in
Warsaw cases. 1
44
Whether courts will allow punitive damages under Article 25
of the Convention145 remains to be seen in light of Zicherman.
Many states do provide for punitive damage recovery, and under
a state choice of law rule, damages might be available under Ar-
ticle 17 of the Convention if Article 25 is found not to preclude
the award of punitive damages.'46
1I. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT
It has been thirty years since the Warsaw Convention's dam-
age limitation, currently $75,000 for U.S. carriers under the
142 But cf Shastri, No. 90-2836 at 3 n.1 (court did not need to address the pro-
priety of punitive damages under the Warsaw Convention because Scottish law
did not provide punitive damages).
143 See Kreindler, supra note 14, at 3. But see Masamillo, supra note 14, at 9-25.
144 Harpalani v. Air-India, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 797, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1986); In reAir
Crash Disaster at Gander, Nfld. on Dec. 12, 1985, 684 F. Supp. 927, 931-33 (W.D.
Ky. 1987). But see Hill v. United Airlines, 550 F. Supp. 1048, 1055-56 (D. Kan.
1982) (finding plaintiffs entitled to punitive damages under an exception to de-
fendant's limited liability on showing it engaged in willful misconduct). The Hill
case has been criticized as to the court's analysis under the Convention in award-
ing punitive damages and is one of the few cases on the books allowing punitive
damages under the Warsaw Convention.
145 Article 25 provides that a carrier is not entitled to shield itself from liability
if the passenger establishes that damages were caused by the carrier's willful mis-
conduct. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25.
14 See id. arts. 17, 25.
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Montreal Interim Agreement,1 47 was altered to provide fair and
swift compensation to passengers and their families for injuries
occurring on international flights. The Convention's damage
limitation has inspired many critics, including plaintiffs and
their counsel, defense counsel, insurance carriers, air carriers
and governmental entities, all of whom believe the limitations
are outmoded, outdated, and should be discarded.
On October 31, 1995, the International Air Transport Associa-
tion (LATA) 148 met in Kuala Lumpur at its fifty-first Interna-
tional Meeting to discuss the potential waiver of the Warsaw
Convention's damage limitation. At this meeting, IATA adopted
a resolution, entitled the "Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger
Liability," which supersedes the Convention's personal injury
damage limitations.149 The IATA Intercarrier Agreement might
be the next step in bringing the Warsaw Convention into the
twenty-first century by providing international travellers and
their families fair compensation in a timely manner.150 This sec-
tion of the Article reviews the provisions of the IATA Agree-
ment, the politics surrounding the Agreement, and the
possibility of the Agreement becoming effective in 1996.
A. THE THREE AGREEMENTS
The LATA Intercarrier Agreement actually consists of three
agreements:
147 Montreal Interim Agreement, supra note 12; 14 C.F.R. § 203.4 (1996).
148 IATA is a private organization whose membership is comprised of interna-
tional air carriers. GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 3, at 4. IATA is also instrumental in
determining the form of flight tickets and airway bills. Id. IATA's purpose is to
"promote safe, regular and economic air transport." Id.; SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra
note 4, at 631-33. The Air Transport Association of America (ATA) is a private
organization of carriers representing the interest of U:S. carriers generally. See
Air Transport Association of America on DOT Order 96-10-7, at 1 n.1 (October 3,
1996). The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), on the other hand,
is an agency of the United Nations that administers the Warsaw Convention and
related treaties. SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 4, at 631-33.
149 Patrick Grady & John S. Hoff, Bye, Bye 'Warsaw,' LAw. PILOTS B. Ass'N J.,
Winter 1996, at 23-24.
150 The support for the IATA Agreements gained much publicity following the
crashes of Miami-based Valujet and TWA Flight 800 in 1996. Robert Kazel,
Valujet Insured for Crash Losses, Bus. INS., May 20, 1996, at 1; Claire Wilkinson,
Structural Failure or Terrorism Thought Likely as Boeing 747 Plunges Into the Sea,
LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, July 19, 1996, at 1; Michael Schachner, TWA Insured for Claims
from Crash, Bus. INS., July 22, 1996, at 1.
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1. The IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability
(11A), opened for signature on October 31, 1995, and signed by
fifty-six international carriers to date;
15 1
2. The IATA Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement (MIA), opened for signature in May,
1996, and signed by twenty-four international carriers to date;
152
and
3. The Air Transport Association's Provisions Implementing
the IATA Intercarrier Agreement to be Included in Conditions
of Carriage and Tariffs (IPA), dated May 16, 1996, and signed by
thirteen carriers (primarily U.S. carriers) to date. a53
The three agreements are intended to operate in conjunction
with one another. But due to some inconsistencies within the
agreements, interpreting them is somewhat difficult. The sim-
plest way to understand how the agreements work in connection
with each other is to view the IIA Agreement as the "umbrella"
agreement, under which the MIA and IPA Agreements fall.
Briefly outlined below are the main points of each agreement:
1. The IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability
* The signatory carriers agree to "take action" and waive all
liability limitations on recoverable compensatory damages in Arti-
cle 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention, so that recovery may be de-
termined and awarded by reference to the law of the domicile of
the passenger.
1 54
9 The carriers are entitled to all available defenses under the
Convention, but may waive any defense, including a defense up
to a specified monetary amount, of recoverable compensatory
damages. 1 5
5
* The carriers reserve their right to recourse against other par-
ties, including contribution and indemnity rights.' 56
* The IIA Agreement is to be enacted no later than November
1, 1996, or upon receipt of requisite government approvals.' 57
151 Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, Oct. 31, 1995 [hereinafter
IIA] (on file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
152 Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement,
May 1996 [hereinafter MIA] (on file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
153 Provisions Implementing the LATA Intercarrier Agreement to be Included
in Conditions of Carriage and Tariffs, May 16, 1996, app. E [hereinafter IPA] (on
file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
154 See IIA, supra note 151, at 1 (emphasis added).
155 Id. at 2.
156 Id. at 3.
'57 Id. at 5.
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2. The IATA Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercar-
rier Agreement
The signatory carriers to the IIA October 31, 1995 Agreement
will incorporate into their conditions of carriage and tariffs,
where necessary, the following:
* The carrier shall not invoke the Warsaw Convention's Article
22(1) liability limitation as to any claim for recoverable compen-
satory damages under Article 17 of the Convention.'58
e No carrier will avail itself to any defense under Article 20 (1)
of the Convention with respect to a claim which does not exceed
100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR) unless at the option of the
carrier, the 100,000 SDR amount can be raised or lowered for
some routes if authorized by the government in which the
route (s) of transportation is involved."'
e The carrier reserves all defenses except as expressly con-
tained within the MIA Agreement and also reserves its right to
proceed against third parties for contribution and indemnity. 6 °
* At the option of the carrier, the carrier agrees that recover-
able compensatory damages may be determined by reference to
the law of the domicile or permanent residence of passenger. 161
* Neither the waiver of the limits nor the waiver of the de-
fenses shall be applicable in respect to claims made by public
social insurance or similar bodies, however asserted. 6 '
3. The Air Transport Association's Provisions Implementing the JATA
Intercarrier Agreement to be Included in Conditions of Carriage and
Tariffs (IPA)
The IPA Agreement, pursuant to the IIA and MIA Agree-
ments, specifies that the signatory carriers to the IPA shall in-
clude the following conditions within the applicable tariffs:
* The carrier shall not invoke the Warsaw Convention's Article
22(1) liability limitation to any claim for compensatory damages
arising under Article 17 of the Convention. 163
* The carrier shall not avail itself to any Article 20(1) defense
with respect to such portion of claim which does not exceed
100,000 SDR. 164
158 See MIA, supra note 152, at I(1).
159 Id. at 1(2) (emphasis added).
160 Id. at 1(3).
16, Id. at II(1).
162 Id. at 11(2).
163 See IPA, supra note 153, at I(1) (emphasis added).
164 Id. at 1(2).
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* The carrier reserves all defenses available under the Conven-
tion, except for as otherwise provided, and also reserves its rights
of recourse against any third party, including rights to contribu-
tion and indemnity.165
* The carrier agrees that the recoverable compensatory dam-
ages may be determined by reference to the law of the domicile
or permanent residence of the passenger, subject to the applica-
ble law of recoverable compensatory damages. 166
e The carrier shall furnish each passenger a notice provision
as to damage recovery under the Warsaw Convention.167
e The implementation of the IPA Agreement constitutes with-
drawal of the Montreal Interim Agreement.' 68
In sum, the three intercarrier agreements have the overall ef-
fect of waiving the Warsaw Convention's damage limitation and
relieving a claimant from the burden of proving the carrier's
willful misconduct to recover full compensation.
With respect to travel to and from the U.S., the MIA applies a
strict liability standard to any claim not exceeding 100,000 SDR
with the presumption of liability contained in Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention remaining intact and applicable. 169 In ef-
fect, the claimant under the MIA is entitled to unlimited provable
damages and a strict liability scheme up to 100,000 SDR. The
burden of proof then shifts to the carrier to prove that it or its
agents took all necessary measures to avoid the damage, or that
it was impossible for the carrier to take such measures as pro-
vided in Article 10 of the Convention in order to avoid liability
for amounts over 100,000 SDR. 170 For any international passen-
ger ticketed to, from or through the U.S., the IATA Intercarrier
Agreements, and specifically the MIA, provide prompt and com-
plete compensation, on a strict liability basis, with no per passen-
ger limits and a measure of damages consistent with U.S. tort
law. 171 The carriers benefit because they will not be subject to
the punitive damages available in many U.S. jurisdictions. 72
Further, the acts preserve the carrier's non-negligent defense
for claims greater than 100,000 SDR, and Article 28 jurisdic-
165 Id. at 1(3).
166 Id. at 1(4).
167 Id. at II.
168 Id. at III.
169 MIA, supra note 152, at 1(2).
170 Id. at 1(3).
171 Baumeister & Latto, supra note 13, at 46-47.
172 See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
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tion. 173 Additionally, claimants will still have to prove compensa-
tory damages.
B. WORKINGS AND INCONSISTENCIES OF THE AGREEMENTS
To summarize the relationship between the agreements, the
IPA pertains to U.S. carriers implementing the IIA and MIA pro-
visions. The MIA further defines the IIA and provides
mandatory and optional provisions for carriers to include in
their conditions of carriage and tariff filings.' 74 At the top is the
IIA, which provides a general framework to guide each carrier
in incorporating general principles into the carrier's conditions
of carriage and tariff filings.
Although the IIA provides the framework and general princi-
ples of the Intercarrier Agreement, it leaves the implementation
of the agreement to individual carriers, to be set forth in each
carrier's conditions of carriage and tariff filings. The MIA di-
rectly addresses the actual language necessary to incorporate the
IIA into a carrier's conditions of carriage and tariff filings, and
contains both mandatory and optional provisions for the carrier
to incorporate. 75 The IPA, on the other hand, is the special
contract that U.S. carriers will use to implement the IIA and
MIA into their conditions of carriage and tariff filings, and
thereby terminate each carrier's participation in the 1966 Mon-
treal Interim Agreement. 7 6 Almost all major U.S. carriers have
signed the IPA. 177
There are some inconsistencies between the 11A, the MIA and
the IPA. But, the inconsistencies make some sense when one
considers the ILA as a general framework, and the MIA and IPA
instruments as refining the general principles set forth in the
IIA umbrella agreement. For example, the provision in the ILA
relating to damage determinations provides that compensatory
damages may be determined by reference to the law of the pas-
senger's domicile. 7 8 The MIA also contains an optional provi-
173 Grady & Hoff, supra note 149, at 23-24. See also MIA, supra note 152, at
I(2),(3).
174 See MIA, supra note 152.
175 See id.
176 See IPA, supra note 153; see also John Parkerson, Why Do Airlines Favor the
Proposed IATA Inter-Carrier Agreement, in AVIATION LIABILITY INTO THE TWENTY FIRST
CENTURY 17, 28-30 (Oct. 9-10, 1996) (on file with The Aviation and Space Law
Committee of the American Bar Association Tort and Insurance Practice
Section).
177 See IPA, supra note 153, at E.
178 See ILA, supra note 151, at 1.
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sion for compensatory damages to be determined by reference
to the law of the domicile or permanent residence of the passen-
ger. 179 Only the IPA makes it mandatory that the carrier agree
"subject to applicable law" that recoverable compensatory dam-
ages are to be determined by the law of the domicile or perma-
nent residence of the passenger.8 " The IPA, which pertains to
U.S. carriers or carriers who travel to, from, or through the U.S.,
ensures that the U.S. passengers are adequately compensated via
U.S. compensatory law, even if the passenger or the family of an
injured passenger does not have Article 28 jurisdiction within
the U.S. 181
Some believe that the IPA compensatory damage provision
contradicts Article 32 of the Warsaw Convention. 182 But such an
assertion is incorrect because the IATA Agreements are not law.
They merely represent "special agreements" between the signa-
tory carriers and passengers under the Convention that do not
infringe on the Convention's rules. 183 Nonetheless, the IPA's
compensatory damage provision of "subject to applicable law" of
the passenger's residence or domicile is compatible with the
Supreme Court's Zicherman decision, 184 which provides that the
determination of applicable damage law under the Warsaw Con-
vention be resolved by the choice of law rules of the forum
jurisdiction.185
It is interesting to note that none of the intercarrier agree-
ments define what constitutes "compensatory damages." Com-
mentary on this subject summarily concedes that compensatory
damages do not include punitive damages. 86 Although com-
pensatory damage is not defined, it is implicit, at least in the
U.S., that the Zicherman decision has established the standard
regarding compensatory damages under the Convention.
179 See MIA, supra note 152, at 1(1).
180 See IPA, supra note 153, at 1(4).
181 See Thomas J. Whalen, Rebirth of the Warsaw Convention: The Proposed IATA
Intercarrier Agreement, in AvIATiON LIABILIT INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY app.
at 6-8 (Oct. 9-10, 1996) (on file with The Aviation and Space Law Committee of
the American Bar Association Tort and Insurance Practice Section).
182 Id. at 13-14.
183 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 32.
184 Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 634.
185 See Whalen, supra note 181, at 13-14.
186 Grady & Hoff, supra note 149, at 23-24; Whalen, supra, note 181, at 3; see
generally Lee S. Kreindler, The End of Airline Liability Limits, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30, 1996,
at 3.
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C. DOT RATIFIES IATA INTERCARRIER AGREEMENTS WITH
CONDITIONS
The Association of Trial Lawyers, the Aerospace Industries As-
sociation, the International Chambers of Commerce, and the
Victims Families Association voiced support for the IATA Agree-
ments.8 7 Also supportive of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement is
the Aviation Insurance Offices Association, as well as prominent
plaintiff and defense attorneys.'
Although the IATA entities provided for a November 6, 1996
implementation date, as of November 12, 1996, the IATA Agree-
ments had not been officially approved by the Department of
Transportation (DOT). The DOT tentatively approved the
three IATA Agreements, as outlined in the DOT's Show Cause
Order 96-10-7, subject to the following conditions:
1. that any carrier travelling to or from the U.S. adopt a "more
favorable to the passenger" provision with respect to recoveries
for personal injury or death under the Warsaw Convention and
the IATA Agreements, that are available in any jurisdiction;
2. that the optional provision for less than 100,000 SDR strict
liability on particular routes could not apply to any operations
(including interline operations) to, from or in connection with
the U.S.;
3. that the provision for waiver of the Warsaw liability limit as
set forth under Article 22 (1) be applicable on a system-wide basis
to each carrier as it relates to Warsaw transportation;
4. that the IATA Agreements would be applicable to any inter-
lining partners of the carrier where transportation was to or from
the U.S., obligating the carrier to either insure all interlining car-
riers where parties to the IATA Agreements or requiring the car-
rier to assume liability for the entire journey;
5. that the provision in the MIA as to social agencies and the
waiver of limits pertaining to Article 20 (1) defenses will not have
any application as to U.S. agencies;
187 Stacy Shapiro, DOT Conditionally Approves Passenger Liability Standards, Bus.
INS., Oct. 14, 1996, at 104; Trial Lawyers Back Passenger Liability Limit Increases,
AvIATION DAILY, Aug. 26, 1996, at 320.
188 Aviation Capacity "Unchanged", WORLD INS. REP., Apr. 5, 1996, at 7; see also
Edwin Unsworth, Aviation Rates May Fall; But U.K. Aviation Insurers Aren't Happy
About It, Bus. INS., Apr. 1, 1996, at 23. AIOA Chairman Barry Wilkes again es-
poused support for the intercarrier agreements because they would eliminate
passenger liability limitations on international flights. Id.; see also FrankJ. Mur-
ray, TWA Behind Other U.S. Airlines in Agreeing to Drop Liability Limits, WASH. TIMES,
July 24, 1996, at A10; Edwin Unsworth, Airline Group Moves to Lift International
Liability Limits: U.S., E.C. Approval Still Needed, Bus. INS., Aug. 5, 1996, at 40.
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6. that all U.S. and foreign air carrier permits and any other
authority who operates to or from the U.S., universally accept the
Agreements with the IPA Agreement as a governing agreement;
and
7. that U.S. carriers agree to submit to the law of the domicile
of the passenger for operations to/from or connecting with the
U.S. (the fifth Article 28 jurisdiction requirement);
8. for carriers that cannot agree to submit to the place of the
domicile of passenger (the fifth jurisdiction notwithstanding the
provisions of Article 28), that DOT propose several alternatives,
including the carrier agreeing to mandatory U.S. arbitration, no-
tice provisions to passengers traveling on foreign air carriers; and
the carriers purchasing accident insurance policies for each trav-
eling passenger in the amount of 500,000 SDR.' 89
The DOT did not, however, incorporate the European Commis-
sion's proposed condition that the carrier make a lump sum
payment of 500,000 ECU to the decedent's next of kin within
ten days of the fatal accident.190
The DOT's eight counts of conditions threatened U.S. ap-
proval of the IATA Agreements. With so many interests at stake,
the IATA derailment by the U.S. was a significant concern indus-
try-wide. On November 12, 1996, the DOT issued its "Order Ap-
proving Agreements," which finalized the DOT's Show Cause
Order and approved the JATA Agreements pendente lite, subject
to the following three conditions:
1. the MIA's optional application as to domiciliary law apply-
ing to compensatory damages would be mandatory for opera-
tions to, from or through the U.S.; 9
2. the MIA's optional provision for less than 100,000 SDR
strict liability on particular routes would be inapplicable as to op-
erations to, from or through the U.S.; and
3. the MIA's provision as to waivers of the limits and waivers of
Article 20(1) defenses will not apply to any U.S. agencies.1 92
189 Department of Transportation, Order to Show Cause, 96-10-7 (Oct. 3,
1996) [hereinafter DOT Show Cause Order].
190 See Mark Odell, EU Liable to Impose Will (European Union's European Commis-
sion Seeks to Regulate Airline Liabilities), AIRLINE Bus., Feb. 1, 1996, at 10; Transport
Ministers Find 'Broad Agreement' on Liability Reform, AVIATION EUR., Oct. 10, 1996, at
1.
191 Department of Transportation Order Approving Agreements, 96-11-6 (Nov.
12, 1996) [hereinafter DOT Approval Order].
192 Id. at 1. The DOT also conditioned approval on the IPA Agreement, pro-
viding that carriers may not withdraw from the 1966 Montreal Interim Agree-
ment due to possible construction of the IPA Agreement only applying to the
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The DOT approved the IATA Agreements with the three con-
ditions, which it hoped would be accepted industry-wide. The
DOT was mindful of various parties' positions as reflected in the
"Comments of the Parties" section of its "Order Approving
Agreements.' 193 The DOT reiterated that acceptance of the
IATA Agreements on an interim basis was in the best public inter-
est, provided that the DOT's conditions as to carrier travel to,
from, and through the U.S. were implemented. 94 What is inter-
esting is that the DOT did not provide a time frame in its No-
vember Order in which the Agreements would be interim. Due
to the lack of a specified interim period, the IATA Agreements
are similar to the Montreal Interim Agreement, which lasted for
thirty years. The IATA Agreements could thus potentially last
for decades, with no alterations or modifications made to the
Agreements. The concern voiced by several groups, such as the
Victims Families Association, which urged that the strict liability
limit be increased to 500,000 SDR with an escalation clause,
could thus possibly go unheard for decades.'95
On January 10, 1997, the DOT modified its November 12,
1996 Order and approved the IATA agreement on an interim
basis.' 96
The Department approved the IATA agreements with two
conditions:
1. Carriers shall not invoke Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's limitation of liability;
2. Carriers shall not invoke the Warsaw Convention's "all neces-
sary measures defense" as set forth in Article 20(1) of the Con-
vention to that portion of the claim that does not exceed
$100,000 SDR. 197
The DOT also provided that its approval of the IATA agree-
ments was interim and that the LATA agreements would be re-
viewed no later than June 30, 1998.198
actual carrier signing the Agreement and not interline segment carriers. Id. at
13.
193 Id. at 7.
194 Id. at 11.
195 Id. at 8-9.
196 Department of Transportation Order on Reconsideration 97-1-2 (January
10, 1997) [hereinafter DOT Reconsideration Order].
197 id. at 10.
198 Id. at 6 (The DOT will replace the interim order with a final order on or
beforeJune 30, 1998).
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The DOT's January 10, 1997 Order was a victory for IATA and
for carriers as the domiciliary law provision that was provided
for in the DOT's Show Cause Order and the Department's No-
vember 1996 Order was absent from the January 1997 Interim
Order.1 99 Additionally, IATA and the carriers were victorious
due to the Warsaw regime remaining intact, at least for the time
being.
The DOT extended the antitrust immunity to any group or
persons to further discussions on issues surrounding the IATA
agreements. 2°° The DOT also provided for advanced notice
provisions of meetings and reporting provisions to all groups
discussion the IATA issues.20 1
Although the IATA Agreements are a step in the right direc-
tion for obtaining just compensation for passengers or family
members injured or killed on international flights, there are
some significant issues which should be addressed. Questions
remain as to whether the IATA Agreements will in fact be in-
terim, even in light of the DOT's June 30, 1998, review date, or
go on for decades unaltered, thus losing step with compensatory
damage recovery over time. Concern also exists regarding the
strict liability damage amount. For example, the 100,000 SDR
strict liability amount did not include an index factor. If the
IATA Agreements are in fact long-term rather than interim
agreements, without an indexing factor, 100,000 SDR quickly
loses its value to keep in step with compensating passengers on
international travel in a meaningful way. Additionally, the con-
dition in the DOT's Show Cause Order that U.S. carriers agree
to submit to the law of the domicile of the passenger for opera-
tions to, from, or in connection with the U.S. (that is, a fifth
Article 28 jurisdiction) is a significant factor for U.S. travellers
and their families, in addition to the mandatory application of
domiciliary law, which were absent froni DOT's 1997 Order. If
the IATA Agreements turn out to be long-term agreements,
these concerns again will go unaddressed.
Although progress has been made, international carriers will
hopefully continue to work with the U.S. government and other
interested entities in order to address concerns not provided for
in the IATA Agreements. It is very likely that IATA will continue
199 The DOT reiterated its expectation in footnote eleven of its order that it
expected "all U.S. Carriers will become parties to and promptly implement the
IPA agreement, which includes the law of the domicile provision." Id. at 6 n.11.
200 Id. at 7-8.
201 Id. at 11-12.
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to work with the DOT and other interested groups to hammer
out additional conditions to be incorporated into the IATA
Agreements, especially in light of the DOT's June 30, 1998 re-
view date. The DOT also now has the opportunity to lobby car-
riers and governmental entities unilaterally so that some of the
DOT's show cause conditions can be incorporated into the
IATA Agreements. The DOT has taken a positive step by ap-
proving the IATA Agreements conditionally and on an interim
basis. There is hope that the DOT will continue to work with
IATA, carriers and governments worldwide to bring the Warsaw
Convention in step with damage recovery and international
travel into the twenty-first century.
Comments

